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Abstract 
 
Economic integration is generally thought to favour convergence in the economic 
performance of previously separated regions; but this is far from universally true, as the 
experience of the members of the Eurozone testifies. The paper considers the two 
sharply contrasting cases of East and West German convergence following reunification 
and the enduring poverty of the Italian Mezzogiorno since Italian unification a century 
and a half ago. In both countries, political integration delivers much higher consumption 
in the lagging relative to the leading region than of per capita GDP. Consumption 
convergence can be supported by transfers but ‘production’ convergence ultimately 
requires catch-up in the production of tradeables. The paper demonstrates the radically 
different performance of the tradeable sector in the two cases, and suggests that this may 
be the result of differences in labour market flexibility, in investment performance and 
in the social norms required for the production of complex manufacturing. 
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Introduction 
 
The presence of both convergence and divergence among countries, and among regions 
within national boundaries poses a challenge for economists. In a unified political area, 
there are common national institutions, and labour and capital, as well as tradeable 
goods and services, can move freely: models of comparative advantage and of growth 
with diminishing returns technology would predict convergence in living standards. 
‘New’ growth and international trade theory provide, however, mechanisms that can 
drive divergence. There is renewed urgency in understanding these processes because of 
the resurgence of populism associated with regionally differentiated winners and losers 
from globalization and technological change [Autor, et. al., 2013]. 
 
This paper looks for lessons in a detailed case study of politically integrated areas. It 
shows that the experience of two regions – Southern Italy (or the Mezzogiorno, as it is 
known in Italian) and East Germany – has been radically different over the last two 
decades, and more modestly, provides a set of possible reasons for divergence in the 
Italian case and convergence in the German one that make sense conceptually and for 
which there is supporting evidence. Although the comparative case study setting is not 
conducive to nailing down a well-identified cause, there are features of this comparison 
that are helpful for interpreting the evidence. Italy and Germany were unified as nation 
states in 1861 and 1871, respectively. Both West Germany and Italy were founding 
members of the European Economic Community, the European Union, and in 1999 of 
the Eurozone. These arrangements define a common set of rules for the two countries in 
relation to cross-border trade and factor mobility as well as for the single market 
established in 1988. The regional economies of the Mezzogiorno and East Germany 
shared these ‘external’ rules of the game for the period of interest beginning with 
German reunification in 1991. 
 
It was often argued, following this reunification, that the economic problems faced by 
East Germany resembled those that have long plagued the Mezzogiorno. Making explicit 
reference to the Italian experience, commentators feared that convergence in living 
standards between the Eastern and Western parts of the country might be very slow and 
that East Germany would for decades suffer from above average unemployment and 
relative poverty [e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991; Sinn and Westermann, 2000; Sinn, 
2002; for dissenting points of view, see Boltho et al., 1997, and Heilemann, 2005]. 
 
The Boltho et al. [1997] paper, in particular, gave three reasons for expecting more 
favourable developments in Germany than had occurred in Italy. First, public 
intervention stimulating machinery and equipment investment, which had generated 
some convergence in the 1960s in Italy, had fallen back in the Mezzogiorno. By contrast, 
early East German experience saw the government actively sustaining investment in the 
region. Second, the competitiveness of the backward area (endangered by wage 
equalization across the country as a whole), while changing little, or even worsening, in 
Southern Italy over several decades, had shown tentative early signs of improvement in 
Eastern Germany, thanks to greater wage and trade union flexibility at a decentralized 
level. Third, social capabilities were arguably very different between the two poorer 
regions. Southern Italy had fallen prey to rent-seeking and corruption in ways which, at 
the time at least, seemed virtually unknown in East Germany. 
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Section 1 looks at the macroeconomic picture and examines whether GDP and 
consumption per capita convergence have occurred or not in the two areas over the last 
two decades. Section II considers how the mechanisms highlighted by the ‘new’ trade 
literature and the empirical results found for international trade can shed light on 
convergence in the regional context. Section III quantifies the importance of trade for 
economic growth within Germany and Italy. The next section then considers trends in 
productive investment, the evolution of competitiveness (including an assessment of the 
importance of the tradeable sector in the two economies) and the complexity of the two 
areas’ exports. Section V assesses the presence (or absence) of social norms supportive 
of growth in the two regions that may help account for integration with divergence in 
Italy and with convergence in Germany. 
 
 
I. Stylized Facts 
 
Figure 1 (left panel) presents data on constant price GDP per capita since the early 
1990s in East Germany and in the Mezzogiorno, expressed as ratios of the GDP per 
capita of the two countries’ richer regions (West Germany and the Centre-North 
respectively).1 The visual evidence points to two fairly clear conclusions: Italy has seen 
virtually no GDP per capita convergence between South and North;2 Germany, by 
contrast, appears to have witnessed rapid convergence between East and West since 
unification.  
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Fig.1. Germany and Italy: The Regional Problem 
 
“Poor” regions’s GDP per capita (left panel) and consumption per capita (right panel) in 
percent of “rich” region’s; constant prices 
                         Figure 1a                                         Figure 1b 
          GDP per capita    Consumption per capita 
 
    
 
 
Sources: Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnung der Länder; ISTAT, Conti e aggregati economici territoriali. 
 
A not dissimilar picture emerges for the gap in (constant price) consumption standards 
(Figure 1a, right panel).  Since both countries are political unions, national taxes and 
transfers are able to decouple regional consumption from regional production. The 
equalizing effect of interregional transfers arising from fiscal policies can be clearly seen 
in Figure 1b: the gap in consumption between the richer and the poorer regions is much 
smaller throughout the period than is the per capita GDP gap. By 2015, per capita 
consumption in East Germany stood at 85 per cent of the Western level as against a 68 
per cent ratio for per capita GDP. The Italian figures in 2014 were 68 and 56 per cent 
respectively. Interestingly, the trends in consumption broadly match (if more starkly) 
those of GDP: East German consumption has converged to that of the West whilst 
Mezzogiorno consumption has fallen further behind that of the rest of the country.  
 
These broad-brush conclusions are confirmed by the econometric evidence presented in 
Table 1 for the GDP per capita gap. For Italy this table updates the results already shown 
East Germany/ 
West Germany 
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in the authors’ earlier paper [Boltho et al., 1997], results which conclusively rejected the 
hypothesis of convergence over the period 1950-90 (with the possible exception of the 
1960s), in line with much of the literature on the subject [e.g. Mauro and Podrecca, 
1994; Paci and Pigliaru, 1999]. Over the period 1990-2014 Italy did experience 
convergence, but only within the geographical areas and not between them. The 
estimated β coefficient is positive and significant, but the South dummy is negative and 
also significant, implying divergence of the Southern regions from the Centre-North. 
This result is entirely driven by the 1990s, when both coefficients were significant and 
relatively large in size, whilst the 2000s experienced neither within nor between regional 
convergence.  
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Table 1 
 
Regressions for per capita output growth, 1990-2016 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
                                         Germany                                              Italy 
                     1991-2000   2000-16    1991-2016   1990-2000    2000-15   1990-2015 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                          Dependent variable: [ln(Yi,t+T) – ln(Yi,t)]/T 
 
Const.          -0.027    0.064*  0.040  0.422***  -0.037 0.180** 
                      (0.059)      (0.027)       (0.029)         (0.106)        (0.054)      (0.060) 
 
β                     -0.003         0.006+    0.003         0.051**  -0.003       0.023* 
                       (0.005)      (0.003)       (0.003)  (0.017)        (0.005)      (0.010) 
 
East            0.054***  0.005* 0.020*** 
                      (0.006)       (0.002)       (0.003) 
 
Centre                                                            -0.003    0.002 -0.003 
                                                                         (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.002) 
 
South                                                                  -0.020**   0.006       -0.009** 
                                                                            (0.006)    (0.003)       (0.003) 
 
No. obs.              16                16              16             20                20                 20 
 
Root MSE    0.0047     0.0026      0.0026      0.0057    0.0029         0.0034 
 
?̅?2                  0.964        0.684       0.947      0.451      -0.047            0.260 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
Estimated equations: 
1
𝑇
∙ [𝑙𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑇) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡)] = 𝐴 − [(1 − 𝑒
−𝛽𝑇) 𝑇⁄ ] ∙ 𝑙𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐷𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑇 
where i denotes the region and Dj denotes dummies for the poor regions (j = East for 
Germany, and j = Centre and South for Italy). 
Germany: 
West: Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Lower Saxony, 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein. 
East: Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia. 
 
Italy: 
North: Piedmont, Aosta Valley, Liguria, Lombardy, Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia-Romagna. 
Centre: Tuscany, Marche, Umbria, Lazio. 
South: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, Sardinia. 
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*     Significant at 5%. 
**   Significant at 1%. 
*** Significant at 0.1%. 
 
 
The German picture is quite different. The very small and barely significant values of 
the β coefficient (negative during the first decade 1991-2000 and positive during 2000-
16), suggest that there was no overall convergence in the country. This matches the 
Italian results and clearly does not fit the 2 per cent “convergence rule” proposed by 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1991]. The East dummy, however, is positive throughout the 
period, and particularly large during the 1990s. The Eastern Länder therefore grew faster 
than the Western ones (by 5½ percentage points per year on average during the period). 
The subsequent decade or so witnessed, however, much slower catch-up between East 
and West with convergence of Eastern Länder barely more rapid than that among those 
in the rest of the country. An alternative periodization for East Germany, excluding the 
years of very rapid convergence between 1991 and 1995, finds similar results: 
convergence for the East in the period 1995-2004, absence of East-specific convergence 
during 2005-2016, and convergence for the period as a whole. Analysis of so-called σ-
convergence – the standard deviation of regional GDP per capita as shown in Figure 2 – 
broadly confirms these results. GDP dispersion remained virtually unchanged in Italy 
since 1990, whereas it fell sharply in Germany during the first half of the 1990s and, 
following some stabilization over the next decade, resumed a gentle and steady 
downward trend since then. 
 
Very similar results emerge for consumption (not shown separately, but available from 
the authors). There is statistically significant convergence in per capita consumption 
between East and West Germany in the 1991-2000 period, but not over 2001-15, and 
there is highly statistically significant divergence between the Centre-North of Italy and 
the Mezzogiorno in both sub-periods. 
 
 
Figure 2. GDP per capita Dispersion 
 
(standard deviation of regional GDP per capita) 
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Sources: Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnung der Länder; ISTAT, Conti e aggregati economici territoriali. 
 
II. Theories of Regional Integration and Convergence 
 
Table 1 above has shown results for absolute convergence equations in GDP per capita. 
This method follows the earlier work of Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1991, 2004], who, 
when surveying within-country convergence of states for the USA and prefectures for 
Japan used the same formulation with dummy variables for larger regions (respectively 
north, south, east and west for the US and districts for Japan). Unlike the Italian and 
German cases, these authors report similar rates of convergence within and between 
regions.   
 
An alternative approach within the neoclassical growth model tradition is to estimate 
conditional convergence equations following Mankiw et al. [1992]. Abstracting from 
common exogenous technological progress, steady state regional differences in GDP per 
capita arise from persistent differences in a few key variables (e.g., the saving rate or the 
population growth rate). For Italy, Di Liberto et al. [2008] show evidence of total factor 
productivity (TFP) and factor-intensity convergence among Italian regions between the 
mid-1960s and mid-1970s, but not since. Byrne et al. [2009] find significant differences 
in TFP levels between the Centre-North and the South, and confirm that there was no 
convergence in TFP across regions over the period 1970-2001. For Germany, Burda and 
Hunt [2001] found that productivity growth rose rapidly at first in the East following 
unification, but then stalled after about 1995. Burda and Severgnini [2015] confirm a 
significant TFP gap in the East, which they attribute to a lower density of managers and 
to insufficient R&D expenditure. Keller [2000] on the other hand, very plausibly points 
to rapid imports of both embodied and disembodied West German technology into East 
Germany as a major reason for the area’s success. 
 
The contrasting experiences of East Germany and Southern Italy suggest that a 
somewhat different approach may help to uncover the mechanisms at work that explain 
This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Elsevier in Journal of Comparative 
Economics: https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-comparative-economics/issues  
Accepted version made available from SOAS Research Online under CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International License from: 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24829/  
  
10 
 
why a poor region remains poor despite low barriers to factor mobility and trade. 
International trade theory provides a possible anchor. In its traditional form, this theory 
argues that trade is driven by differences in endowments (Heckscher-Ohlin) or in 
productivity (Ricardo) across countries (or regions). Regional integration, by extending 
the size of the market and increasing opportunities for specialization according to 
comparative advantage, would raise productivity across all regions. In the presence of 
diminishing returns, this, in turn, would promote convergence.  
 
“New” trade theory suggests, however, that countervailing forces due to positive 
feedbacks such as economies of scale are also possible, with integration leading to 
rising, rather than declining, differences between regions (or nations) [Matsuyama, 
2004]. In other words, trade itself can be the cause of divergences across geographic 
areas. Even regions that were initially identical could evolve to different steady states if 
affected by different shocks. Moreover, if sectors differ in ways that interact with 
country- or region-specific market imperfections, institutions or culture, specialization 
under integration can sustain multiple equilibria. Evidence of the independent role of a 
number of such sources of comparative advantage – in addition to standard Heckscher-
Ohlin endowment effects – is found for a large cross country dataset and reported by 
Chor [2010]. The method applies to comparative advantage the technique introduced by 
Rajan and Zingales [1998] to investigate growth in which a measure of industry 
performance in a sample of countries is regressed on the interaction of a variable 
capturing industry characteristics estimated from a single country (usually the US) with 
individual country characteristics, such as, for instance, the presence of the rule of law. 
As applied to trade, the dependent variable is bilateral exports. 
 
One aspect, in particular, that has been shown in such cross-country research to drive 
comparative advantage, is the complexity of tradeable goods produced.  Chor [2010] 
reports the independent significance of three different channels through which 
complexity of exports interacts with the rule of law. Levchenko [2007] measures 
complexity by the number of input suppliers, Nunn [2007] by the relationship-specificity 
of goods as indicated by the share of their inputs not traded on organized exchanges 
(such as commodity exchanges) or with reference prices (e.g. published in catalogues), 
and Costinot [2009] by job complexity, which requires that firms and workers enter 
contracts inducing high effort in the absence of monitoring. In a separate literature on 
exports and growth, Hausmann et al. [2013] rank manufactured products by the amount 
of know-how required to produce them.  
 
The presence of complex exports, in turn, is a function of institutional features 
characterizing countries (or regions). The evidence points to the role of formal and 
informal institutions, such as the de jure and de facto rule of law, and culture. Trust can 
substitute for formal legal enforcement and Tabellini [2008] finds that there is a 
tendency for countries with higher trust among its citizens to specialize in the production 
of relationship-intensive goods (the same could be expected for countries able to enforce 
the rule of law). Similarly, countries (or regions) where trust between employers and 
employees exists have a comparative advantage in goods that require many tasks for 
which monitoring of quality is not possible [Costinot, 2009]. As Belloc and Bowles 
[2017, forthcoming] show in a theoretical model, trust can play a role in sustaining 
divergence under integration. Complex goods require quality labour inputs and can only 
be produced where there is an “institutions-culture convention” in which managers offer 
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a partnership contract and workers respond reciprocally by exerting unmonitored effort. 
If such a “convention” or social norm is present in one region/country, but not in the 
other, trade enhances the persistence of existing cultures and institutions. The lagging 
region benefits from gains from trade; this reinforces its specialization in the production 
of simple goods, and thus raises the cost of switching away from its “hierarchical-
management convention” that cannot produce the complex good. The opposite happens 
in the high trust region. 
 
III. Trade and Growth 
 
The previous section has argued that the ability of a region to specialize in complex 
tradeable products could be a crucial variable for explaining persistent GDP per capita 
differences across geographic areas even when there are low barriers to factor mobility 
and trade. As a first step in the argument, Figure 3 compares the share of total trade in 
output for the two cases. In both countries, the richer region shows higher tradeable 
shares than the poorer one, but East Germany exhibits a sharply rising share in recent 
years and seems to be closing the gap with the West, in contrast to the more modest 
evolution in the Mezzogiorno. East Germany’s openness in the early to mid-1990s was 
similar to that of the Mezzogiorno at the time; today it is almost twice as high and 
converging to that of the Centre-North of Italy. 
 
Figure 3. Foreign Trade Share 
(Merchandise exports plus imports in % of GDP) 
 
 Figure 3a    Germany           Figure 3b   Italy 
 
Sources: Statistiches Bundesamt, Aussenhandel, Jahresdaten ab 1970;  
 ISTAT, Commercio estero, serie storiche.   
 
 
This suggestion is tested more precisely in Table 2, which shows the results of an 
econometric exercise regressing regional GDP per capita on trade shares in 2012, 
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following an instrumental variables (IV) approach (full details are provided in the 
Statistical Annex). The methodology adopted here was originally developed by Frankel 
and Romer [1999] who used the geographic network of trade as an exogenous 
instrument to investigate the issue of causality and concluded that it was trade that 
generated high income. The results shown in the Table (which replicates the Frankel and 
Romer approach) confirm the role of foreign trade in differentiating regional incomes in 
both Germany and Italy, in line with earlier work along these lines [Buch and Toubal, 
2009; Buch and Monti, 2010]. Interestingly, in the cross-section results the role of 
foreign trade seems to be more important in Italy than it is in Germany, as shown by the 
much larger coefficients on the trade share. This suggests that the Mezzogiorno's income 
per capita is held back by the region's limited involvement in international trade much 
more so than is the case in East Germany. 
 
Table 3 adds to these regressions a dummy variable for the two “poor” regions.3 This 
variable is not significant in the case of East Germany, but for Italy it is highly 
significant in the OLS version and marginally significant in the IV version. Including the 
dummy variable greatly improves the explanatory power of the IV model in the case of 
Italy. One possible (and plausible) interpretation of these results is that East Germany’s 
lower per capita GDP is well accounted for by its lower propensity to trade relative to 
West Germany, while Southern Italy’s income gap is due not only to this factor, but also 
to other unfavourable, and possibly non-economic, features associated with the 
Mezzogiorno. 
 
Table 2 
 
Regressions for trade and GDP per capita - 1 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                 Germany                                              Italy 
 
                                       OLS                      IV                       OLS                      IV 
_____________________________________________________________________                       
 
                                               Dependent variable: ln(Y/Population) 
 
Const.                          2.459***              2.455***              4.735***             5.327*** 
                                    (0.277)                 (0.237)                  (0.855)                (1.116) 
 
Trade share                  0.608***              0.612***             1.269***             2.228*** 
                                    (0.064)                  (0.088)                 (0.270)                (0.356) 
 
Ln population              0.183***              0.183***             -0.020                 -0.072 
                                    (0.040)                 (0.035)                  (0.101)                (0.097) 
 
Ln area                       -0.100***             -0.100***            -0.196                  -0.255 
                                   (0.015)                  (0.014)                 (0.144)                (0.187) 
 
 
No. obs.                16                        16                          20                        20 
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Root MSE                   0.112                   0.097                     0.197                   0.222 
 
?̅?2                                 0.804                   0.805                     0.428                    0.093 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Estimation methods: ordinary least square (OLS) for Columns 1 and 3; 
instrumental variables (IV) for Columns 2 and 4. Endogeneous variable: trade share. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
*** Significant at 0.1%. 
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Table 3 
 
Regressions for trade and GDP per capita - 2 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                Germany                                              Italy 
                                      OLS                      IV                       OLS                      IV 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                              Dependent variable: ln(Y/Population)   
 
Const.                          2.677***              2.732***               3.474***             4.442*** 
                                    (0.370)                 (0.265)                   (0.855)                (0.718) 
 
Trade share                 0.570***              0.535***               0.360                   1.386** 
                                    (0.074)                 (0.090)                   (0.222)                (0.436) 
 
Ln population             0.147*                  0.145***              -0.066                  -0.076 
                                    (0.062)                 (0.051)                   (0.035)                (0.061) 
 
Ln area                       -0.086**              -0.088***               0.027                  -0.116 
                                    (0.026)                 (0.025)                   (0.064)                (0.119) 
 
Dummy for                -0.083                  -0.090                    -0.417***            -0.217+ 
   “poor” region           (0.085)                 (0.066)                   (0.081)                (0.119) 
 
 
No. obs.                 16                       16                            20                        20 
 
Root MSE                   0.111                  0.093                       0.109                   0.144 
 
 ?̅?2                              0.805                  0.804                       0.825                   0.590                   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Estimation methods: ordinary least square (OLS) for Columns 1 and 3; 
instrumental variables (IV) for Columns 2 and 4. Endogeneous variable: trade share. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. 
+     Significant at 10%. 
*     Significant at 5%. 
**   Significant at 1%. 
*** Significant at 0.1%. 
 
 
Having established some support for a causal role for foreign trade at a moment of time, 
a more elaborate attempt was made to search for a driving role for foreign trade through 
time. This is presented in Table 4 which shows the results of linking the evolution of the 
GDP per capita gap over the last decade (data availability limits the time span to the 
years 2004-14) to the same geographic network of trade data already used to obtain the 
results shown in Tables 2 and 3. The model was estimated by pooled panel regression, 
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both by OLS and by instrumental variable (the constructed trade share was obtained 
using a similar two-step procedure as for Tables 2 and 3). The results broadly confirm 
those of Tables 2 and 3. The trade share is positive and statistically significant for 
Germany, and only weakly significant for Italy when estimated by OLS. The dummy for 
the poor region is only weakly significant with OLS, but ceases to be significant when 
the trade share is instrumented. It is interesting to look at the role of the trade share 
interacted with the dummy for the poor region. For Germany, the interaction is negative 
but less than the coefficient on the trade share. The role of trade for East German regions 
is thus lower than for West German regions for the decade from 2004, but remains 
positive: the estimated coefficient is 0.051 for OLS and 0.026 with IV, and is 
statistically significant for both (the test statistics are F = 95.22 for OLS and Chi2 = 
10.75 for the IV estimation). The trade coefficients are however not significant for Italy, 
neither for the whole country nor for the southern regions. These findings suggest that 
trade has played an important role in driving GDP per capita growth through time in 
East Germany, but has not done so in the Mezzogiorno. 
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Table 4  
 
Regressions for trade and GDP per capita – Panel data, 2004-2014 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                Germany                                              Italy 
                                      OLS                      IV                       OLS                      IV 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                   Dependent variable: ln(Y/Population) 
 
Const.                          8.528                   12.510                     7.307                  1506.7 
                                    (7.565)                 (8.153)                  (29.558)              (6228.0) 
 
Trade share                 0.073***              0.083***                0.510+                -77.18 
                                    (0.004)                 (0.007)                   (0.278)                (303.8) 
 
Ln population              0.161***              0.170***              -0.675***            1.368 
                                    (0.017)                 (0.016)                   (0.078)                (8.653) 
 
Ln area                       -0.105**               -0.110***               0.873***             0.804 
                                    (0.008)                 (0.008)                   (0.124)                (5.562) 
 
Dummy for               -16.450+               -30.970                    19.830+              -2417.8 
   “poor” region           (9.865)                (11.320)                  (39.184)             (10438.1) 
 
Trade share                -0.022***             -0.057***              -0.746+                 180.0 
× Dummy for              (0.006)                 (0.011)                   (0.391)                (765.3) 
   “poor” region 
 
Year                           -0.004                   -0.006                    -0.004                  -0.744 
                                    (0.004)                 (0.004)                   (0.015)                (3.066) 
 
Year                            0.008+                  0.016**                 -0.010                   1.180 
× Dummy for              (0.005)                 (0.006)                   (0.020)                (5.098) 
   “poor” region 
 
 
No. obs.                176                     176                         220                       220 
 
Trade variables           95.22***             10.75***                 0.65                     0.05 
 
“Poor” region vars.     15.08***             44.62***               22.03***               0.11 
 
Root MSE                   0.109                  0.111                       0.469                   12.84 
 
 ?̅?2                              0.833                  0.819                       0.611                         - 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Note: Estimation methods: ordinary least square (OLS) for Columns 1 and 3; 
instrumental variables (IV) for Columns 2 and 4. Endogenous variable: trade share. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. 
Trade variables: test on the sum of the coefficients on the trade variables (F test for 
OLS, Chi2 for IV): 
(Trade share) + (Trade share × Dummy for “poor region). 
“Poor” region variables: test on the sum of the coefficients on the trade variables (F test 
for OLS, Chi2 for IV): 
(Dummy for “poor” region) + (Trade share × Dummy for “poor” region) + (Year × 
Dummy for “poor” region). 
 
+     Significant at 10%. 
*     Significant at 5%. 
**   Significant at 1%. 
*** Significant at 0.1%. 
 
 
IV. Investment, comparative costs and complex exports 
 
The previous section contrasted the scale and evolution of the tradeable sector in Italy 
and Germany, and confirmed at the regional level the Frankel-Romer result that success 
in trade is important for raising GDP per capita. The models in Section II provide some 
overall guidance about the mechanisms that may, or may not, drive integration, through 
which regions in a country can benefit differentially. The following will focus on three 
of these: investment, competitiveness and the complexity of exports.  
 
Investment 
Italy’s post-war experience suggests that high levels of investment in machinery and 
equipment in the Mezzogiorno relative to the Centre-North were an important reason for 
the short-lived convergence that the country experienced in the decade from the mid-
1960s, and that subsequent subdued productive investment trends in the South share 
much of the blame for the lack of convergence in the 1970s and 1980s [Boltho et al., 
1997]. The same story seems to apply in more recent times. Relative to the North of the 
country, investment in machinery and equipment weakened further in the 1990s and in 
the early 2000s [Figure 4]. Since 2003 data on this variable are no longer available, but 
use of an imperfect proxy (fixed investment in the manufacturing sector) suggests that 
relative decline has, if anything, accelerated over the last decade or so. 
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Figure 4. Germany and Italy: Investment in Machinery and Equipment 
 
(ratio of shares in GDP; constant prices) 
 
 
Sources: Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnung der Länder; ISTAT, Conti e aggregati economici territoriali. 
 
 
The evidence available for East Germany shows a different evolution. In the early years 
of unification (1991-2000), when the West poured resources into the East of the country 
primarily in infrastructure provisions, the ratio of investment in machinery and 
equipment to GDP was, in East Germany, well above that of West Germany [Figure 4]. 
These happened to be years of extremely rapid GDP per capita convergence. Since then, 
as investment subsidies were phased out and the quality of East Germany’s 
infrastructure reached best practice levels, the difference in investment performance 
between the two regions has gradually diminished (and convergence has also slowed 
down). 
 
Over the last twenty years, the contrast between Italy and Germany in this area is 
striking and fits well with the contrast in convergence shown in Figure 1. And the 
picture fits also with what is known about public involvement in investment. The Italian 
government actively promoted investment in the South in the 1960s, both directly 
through State-owned enterprises and indirectly via help to the private sector, but then 
gradually abandoned such efforts in subsequent decades, shifting the focus of aid 
policies towards the creation of public sector jobs and income maintenance transfers. 
Policy-driven success in raising investment appears to have achieved a temporary halt to 
the relative decline of the Mezzogiorno. But the positive feedbacks of increasing returns 
and agglomeration effects in industry associated with the episode were insufficient to 
produce a lasting change in industrial structure in the South. 
 
There are some similarities with the concentrated phase of public involvement in 
investment in East Germany that immediately followed reunification. Most public 
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efforts to sustain machinery and equipment investment were in the early years of 
unification; expenditure in more recent times saw a shift towards social welfare transfer 
payments. That this, however, has not translated into a halt to the GDP per capita 
convergence process between East and West, as happened in Italy, is almost certainly 
linked to the much more successful performance of the East German private sector and, 
in particular, of its tradeable industries. 
 
Competitiveness and the Tradeable Sector 
 
As was rightly argued [Sinn and Westermann, 2000], one of the main obstacles that Italy 
has had to face in its attempts to develop the South has been the near equalization of 
wage levels between richer and poorer areas of the country despite the continuing 
existence of significant gaps in productivity levels. This has had predictable 
consequences on the competitiveness of the backward regions and, as was argued in the 
authors’ earlier paper, clearly held back Southern Italian growth [Boltho et al., 1997]. 
For Germany a similar danger was feared in the light of early proposals to transfer West 
Germany’s wage bargaining structures and welfare system to the East, with an aim of 
raising Eastern wage levels to 85 per cent of those in the West. Indeed, for the crucial 
engineering sector, wage parity was expected to occur as early as in 1994. In the event, 
these dangers have not materialized. Already in the early years of unification the 
available evidence was suggesting that wage level convergence was much slower and 
less widespread than had been feared at the outset. 
 
Developments in Germany since then have broadly confirmed that the East German 
labour market has adapted with a surprising degree of flexibility to unification, a 
flexibility that has, so far at least, escaped the labour market of Southern Italy. It is true 
that compensation levels have not risen in either region relative to their richer 
counterparts.  Throughout the last two decades they stood at some 80 per cent of the 
Centre-North level in the Mezzogiorno, and, from the mid-1990s, at some 70 per cent, of 
the West’s level in East Germany. But labour productivity in industry fell in Southern 
Italy relative to the Centre-North, while it rose very rapidly in East Germany from the 
low point of 1991, going from merely one quarter of the West German level to three 
quarters by 2004. It is true, however, that this convergence has stalled since the outbreak 
of the "Great Recession".  
 
These developments are combined into a measure of unit labour costs in manufacturing 
shown in the left panel of Figure 5. The chart speaks for itself. Italy’s South has, over 
the last two decades, had a real exchange rate that seems too high. Admittedly, the gap 
between North and South is not huge (and, if a proper allowance could be made for 
underground economic activities, which are much more widespread in the Mezzogiorno, 
the gap might even disappear altogether). But German developments are of a different 
order of magnitude. Over the last twenty years unit labour costs have nearly halved in 
East Germany compared to what was happening in West Germany. No doubt, East 
Germany’s real exchange rate in 1991 must have been hopelessly uncompetitive, but 
this no longer seems to be the case today. This being said, the last few years have seen 
the downward trend in the East’s real exchange rate interrupted as productivity growth 
recovered more slowly in the new Länder after the “Great Recession” than it did in West 
Germany. 
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The right panel of Figure 5 shows the external trade position of the two poor regions. 
Taking the deficit on goods and non-factor services as a proxy for the net absorption of 
real resources,4 yields figures for the two areas that are very similar for the period 2000-
14 (21 and 22 per cent of GDP for East Germany and the Mezzogiorno respectively), but 
while there is virtually no trend in the Italian data, the East German figure decreases 
rapidly through time (falling to 13 per cent in 20145 as against Italy’s 19 per cent in that 
year). 
 
 
Figure 5. Germany and Italy: Relative Unit Labour Costs in Industry and External 
Balance  
 
                   Figure 5a                                                   
Relative Unit Labour Cost, 1990 or 1991=100                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
Sources: Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnung der Länder; ISTAT, Conti e aggregati economici territoriali. 
 
 
A test of the proximate importance of investment and competitiveness for trends in GDP 
per capita is investigated in Table 5 which presents econometric results based on a 
specification almost identical to the one used in the authors’ earlier paper to throw light 
on developments in the Italian Mezzogiorno/Centre-North GDP per capita gap for the 
period 1957-1993 [Boltho et al., 1997].6 The major difference with the approach 
followed in that paper is the addition of migration as a further variable following the 
work by Burda and Hunt [2001] and Hunt [2006] on the role of migration in the factor 
Figure 5b 
Deficit on Goods and Non-Factor                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
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mobility channel for convergence.7 During the estimation process it was found that a 
statistically significant structural break could be observed in 2002 in Germany.8 Hence a 
dummy variable from 2002 was also introduced into the specification. The results for 
Germany show that the three variables, investment, competitiveness and migration, are 
statistically highly significant, with the regression accounting for virtually the total 
variance in the East/West GDP per capita evolution. Despite the limited variation in the 
dependent and independent variables over the estimation period in Italy, reflected in the 
lack of significance of the lagged dependent variable, the results for Italy are similar, 
although migration is not significant. Taking account of the lagged dependent variable in 
Germany, the size of the coefficient on competitiveness, measured by relative unit 
labour cost, is virtually the same in both countries. 
 
The standardized coefficients show that the investment gap and unit labour costs are the 
most important variables for Germany, with long-run standardized elasticities at the 
means of 0.24 and -0.27 respectively, whereas for Italy the unit labour cost variable is 
the most important factor in influencing the output gap, with a long-run standardized 
elasticity of -0.53. 
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Table 5 
 
Regressions for evolution of per capita output gap between the “poor”  
and the “rich” region  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                          Germany                                     Italy 
                                                        (1992-2014)                           (1991-2014) 
                    _________________________________________________________ 
 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita (“poor”)/GDP per capita (“rich”) (in const. prices) 
 
Const.                                                  34.796***                              67.696** 
                                                            (4.541)                                  (18.980) 
 
GDPgapt-1                                             0.445***                                0.175 
                                                              0.578                                     0.190 
                                                             (0.044)                                   (0.239) 
 
Invgapt-1                                                7.042***                                2.607* 
                                                              0.292                                      0.305 
                                                             (1.467)                                   (1.235) 
 
ULC                                                     -0.144***                             -0.242* 
                                                             -0.269                                   -0.536 
                                                             (0.027)                                   (0.088) 
 
Migration from East/Southt-1               0.00003***                           -0.00005 
                                                             0.157                                     -0.146 
                                                            (0.000006)                             (0.00004) 
 
Dummy 2002                                       4.152*** 
                                                              0.365 
                                                             (0.667) 
 
No. obs.                                                   23                                          24 
 
SE of regression                                    0.621                                     0.592 
 
?̅?2                                                          0.988                                     0.804 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Standardized regression coefficients in italics. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors in brackets. 
 
GDPgap = Ratio of “poor” region’s GDP per capita to “rich” region’s GDP per capita. 
Invgap = Ratio of investment in machinery and equipment/GDP in “poor” region to 
                investment in machinery and equipment/GDP in “rich” region. 
ULC = Ratio of manufacturing unit labour costs in “poor” region to manufacturing 
            labour costs in “rich” region. 
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A Chow test on a structural break in the coefficients in 2002 for Germany gives F = 
5.402, p=0.0066. 
*     Significant at 5%. 
**   Significant at 1%. 
*** Significant at 0.1%. 
 
 
An alternative illustration of diverging competitiveness trends is provided in Figure 6 
which looks at the evolution of employment in the manufacturing sector. Not 
surprisingly perhaps, manufacturing employment declines over the last two decades in 
both the richer and the poorer regions of the two countries (the results for employment 
in a much broader measure of the tradeable sector are very similar).9 The drop is 
particularly noticeable in East Germany which, in 1991, had inherited an overly 
developed industrial sector from its Communist past. De-industrialization, accelerated 
by a totally uncompetitive exchange rate and by the often destructive operation of the 
Treuhandanstalt (the organization charged with privatizing Eastern enterprises), was 
thus extremely rapid in the early years of unification. From the mid-1990s, however, 
while de-industrialization continued in West Germany, it was slowly reversed in the 
East, in stark contrast to what was happening in Southern Italy. Here, the already low 
share of manufacturing employment went on declining, and at a somewhat faster rate 
than was recorded in the Centre-North of the country. While such employment in West 
Germany is still higher than it is in East Germany, the latter region has been closing the 
gap in recent years, no doubt reflecting the trends in relative competitiveness shown in 
Figure 5a. In Italy, by contrast, relative de-industrialization has continued. 
 
Figure 6. Employment in Manufacturing 
(in per cent of total employment) 
 
 Germany    Italy 
 
 
Source: Oxford Economics Data Bank. 
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Export complexity  
 
It is noteworthy that the share in total exports accounted for by the most advanced and 
complex manufacturing sector (machinery and transport equipment), is very similar in 
East and West Germany (48 and 52 per cent respectively), while it is much lower in both 
absolute and relative terms in the Mezzogiorno (27 per cent, as against the 39 per cent of 
the Centre-North). And this share has declined dramatically since the late 1990s, in 
contrast to the rough stability recorded elsewhere in Italy. Regional commodity trade 
data for Germany are only available since 1995. Between that date and 2014, this share 
has risen somewhat in East Germany (bar the sharp drops experienced in both parts of 
the country during the “Great Recession” of 2009-10). Indeed, the share of such high-
tech industries as pharmaceutical and electronic machinery in total exports has been 
higher in the East than in the West in every single year since 2002 (the Italian data do 
not provide a similarly detailed breakdown).  
 
The reason for concentrating attention on such lines of activity is that recent research has 
shown that “specializing in some products will bring higher growth than specializing in 
others” [Hausmann et al., 2007, p.1]. And the goods that are conducive to growth are 
complex ones (i.e. requiring numerous and diverse capabilities). A rough attempt was 
made to estimate the “complexity” of the two poorer regions’ export bundles by 
applying the “product complexity indices” shown in Hausmann et al. [2013], to the 
commodity trade data.10 In 2014, for instance (but also in 2000) these indices were much 
higher in East Germany than they were in the Mezzogiorno (Table 6). The apparent 
greater production complexity of East Germany would thus seem to benefit the region 
(relatively to Southern Italy) in two main ways. First, it is bound to stimulate growth 
along the lines explored by Hausmann et al. [2007]. Second, it suggests that the area 
enjoys relatively high institutional quality (on which more below), in line with the new 
approaches to international trade that link export performance in complex sectors to a 
country’s quality of institutions and levels of trust and that were already mentioned in 
Section II above [Levchenko, 2007; Costinot, 2009].11 
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Table 6 
 
Export complexity indices 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                     Germany               West                    East 
                                                       
                                                _____________________________________________ 
 
2010                                                 1.96 
2000                                                 1.87                    1.90                    1.70 
2014                                                 1.70                    1.75                    1.68 
 
 
                                                        Italy               Centre-North       Mezzogiorno 
                                               _____________________________________________ 
 
2010                                                 1.40 
2000                                                 1.42                    1.44                    1.26 
2014                                                 1.42                    1.45                    1.27 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Hausmann et al. , 2013 for 2010 data; authors’ calculations for 2000 and 2014. 
For further detail see text. 
 
 
This proposition is very simply tested by regressing the 2010 “economic complexity 
indices” shown in Hausmann et al., [2013] for 128 countries on the World Bank’s “Rule 
of Law” index, or on Transparency International’s “Perception of Corruption” indices 
for 2010. Results show that these governance indicators are, indeed, positively 
correlated with export complexity (and with statistically highly significant coefficients). 
Controlling for GDP per capita, whether expressed in current dollars or in purchasing 
power parities, adds virtually nothing to the outcome.12 These findings apply to 
countries, not regions, but the available evidence strongly suggests that German regions 
are fairly uniformly endowed with similar levels of both the rule of law and the relative 
absence of corruption, while this is hardly the case of Italy [Charron, 2013]. Using the 
survey evidence presented in Charron et al., [2014] on these two indicators for 2010 and 
2013, shows the Mezzogiorno falling short of Centre-North standards by very large 
margins in both areas, while East Germany either lags West Germany by relatively small 
margins (rule of law in 2013 and corruption in 2010), or actually outperforms West 
Germany (rule of law in 2010 or corruption in 2013). 
 
The overall conclusions of this and of the previous sub-sections are clear: tradeables 
seem to be a crucial variable in explaining regional income differences. In East Germany 
the share of tradeables in output is higher than it is in the Mezzogiorno; it has also risen 
much more rapidly and the export bundle the region sells on world markets is made up 
of much more complex products than those sold by Southern Italy. There are numerous 
reasons for these differences, some of which (such as investment efforts or labour 
market flexibility) have been discussed above. One further reason may well lie in the 
different formal and informal institutions that characterize the two regions. 
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V. Institutions (formal and informal) and regional growth 
Much of the literature that has looked at the economic problems of Southern Italy has 
stressed the importance of historically rooted social factors in holding back the 
Mezzogiorno’s development, and, in particular, the relative absence of pro-growth social 
norms when compared to the situation of the Centre-North. Social norms, defined as 
shared understandings about behavior and attitudes, include trust, and underpin the 
accumulation of social or civic capital.13  
 
The origins of these gaps in Italy have, in turn, been traced back to differences in the 
longer-run evolution of political institutions [Tabellini, 2010] and to the legacy 
stemming from the existence for several centuries of relatively free city states in the 
North in contrast to the absolutist regimes in the South [Putnam, 1993; Guiso et al., 
2008]. The latter authors, in particular, estimate that up to 50 per cent of the gap in 
social capital between the North and the South of Italy could be attributed to the early 
independent city state experience of Central-Northern Italy. In a similar vein, it has been 
recently argued that different social norms in the Mezzogiorno could be indirectly 
responsible for more than half of the labour productivity gap between the two parts of 
the country. This conclusion is based on a regional comparison of a very simple task (the 
time taken in vote counting at national elections) which reveals startling differences in 
labour efficiency across Italian regions, differences which, it is (plausibly) suggested, 
could be linked to the presence or absence of social norms of work ethic and trust 
[Ilzetzki and Simonelli, 2017] 
 
There is no similar literature on Germany possibly because there was no similar contrast 
in the country’s historical development (barring the important interlude of the forty plus 
years of Communist rule in the East). While Germany was subdivided for centuries into 
countless small states, many run in absolutist ways [De Long and Shleifer, 1993], there 
seem to have been relatively few large differences between what are today the West and 
the East of the country.14 So-called “free and imperial cities” existed in both areas 
[Jacob, 2010]. The Hanseatic League was just as active in Hamburg and Bremen as it 
was in Rostock and Magdeburg. The grid of fluvial and land routes that criss-crossed 
Germany covered the whole country from the early Middle Ages onwards [Deutsch, 
1953] and Leipzig was the seat of a renowned fair since roughly the same time [Bairoch, 
1985]. Looking at early human capital formation, while by 1500 Central-Northern Italy 
had at least a dozen universities, as against the Mezzogiorno’s three, what is today 
Eastern Germany boasted five universities, as against the seven of the much larger West 
[Verger, 2003]. 
 
Turning to more recent times, Germany’s industrialization was spearheaded by Saxony 
in the East. Rough estimates of the share of employment accounted for by industry 
suggest that in 1861 this stood at perhaps 35 per cent in what is today East Germany, as 
against some 20 per cent in the Western part of the country. By 1907, these shares had 
reached 51 and 34 per cent respectively [Tipton, 1976]. In Italy, by contrast, the 
Mezzogiorno’s industrial employment in 1911 stood at 9 per cent of the total population, 
as against the Centre-North’s 13 per cent [Ciccarelli and Missiaia, 2013]. And incomes 
per capita were almost certainly higher at the end of the 19th century in what is today 
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East Germany than they were in the West [Borchardt, 1966]; the most recent Italian 
estimates indicate, conversely, that at the same time Central-Northern Italians were 
some 10 to 20 per cent richer than their Southern counterparts [SVIMEZ, 2011]. 
 
All this shows that prior to the communist period, there was no west-east gap in 
economic development in Germany unlike the north-south one that had opened up in 
Italy by that time. None of it, however, proves that trust and social capital are today 
more evenly distributed across Germany than they are across Italy. Indeed, there have 
been suggestions that the forty years of Communist rule in the East might well have 
destroyed much of the area’s pre-existing social capital [Howard, 2003]. In particular, 
the hugely oppressive presence of the former GDR’s security and spying apparatus 
could have been expected to have significantly reduced trust within the region. This 
seems confirmed by empirical investigations: the more state surveillance any particular 
East German district had suffered from in GDR days, the lower were, in the mid-2000s, 
its electoral participation, sports club membership and organ donations, all indicators 
often deemed to represent the presence, or absence, of trust [Jacob and Tyrell, 2010; 
Lichter et al., 2016]. And this absence may well be a contributory factor to these 
districts’ below average per capita incomes and above average unemployment rates 
[ibid.]. 
 
Such results are confirmed by research exploring the relative presence of trust in East 
and West Germany. Evidence using survey data shows that East Germans displayed 
significantly less trusting attitudes than West Germans not only shortly after unification, 
but also a decade later [Rainer and Siedler, 2009]. And while some convergence with the 
West is present, it is very slow: “Individuals who experienced the GDR system still [in 
2008] show a relatively higher level of social distrust and skepticism” [Heineck and 
Süssmuth, 2013, p.798]. Nor can trust have been helped by the ruthless way West 
Germany de facto colonized the Eastern Länder [Giacché, 2013].15 Similarly, evidence 
based on games played by both Eastern and Western citizens has shown that the former 
exhibit less solidarity than the latter [Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999; Brosig-Koch et al., 
2011] and are also more likely to cheat than their Western compatriots [Ariely et al., 
2014].16 All this suggests that an erosion of the stock of social capital took place under a 
completely different set of political and economic rules and that it persisted after those 
rules were replaced.   
 
Yet, more direct (and harder) evidence does not indicate that trust and cooperation are 
now less present relative to the West of the country, than they are in the Mezzogiorno, 
relative to the Centre-North of Italy (Table 7). A proxy used to look at the presence or 
absence of social capital is the extent of underground economic activities. The available 
comparable estimates of the weight of the shadow economy give a picture that suggests 
that East Germany is a relatively more law-abiding society than is Southern Italy 
[Tafenau et al., 2010].17 Several other trust-related indicators would seem to support the 
conclusion that trust is more present in relative terms in today’s East Germany than it is 
in Southern Italy. One is the extent of voluntary work that is supplied in the two areas. 
Another is the presence of non-profit organizations per head of the population (measured 
following uniform international guidelines). And that most untainted indicator of all, 
often used to proxy social trust, organ donations, shows that these too are more frequent 
in East Germany than they are in West Germany, in total contrast to the picture for Italy. 
There, over the years 2000-14, organ donations per million people averaged 26 per year 
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in the Centre-North and only 11 in the Mezzogiorno [Centro nazionale trapianti]. In 
Germany, over the years 2005-14, the equivalent East German figure (including Berlin) 
was 17.5, the West German one 13.2 [Deutsche Stiftung Organtransplantation].18 
 
 
Table 7 
 
Some Indicators of Social Capital 
 
(“poor region” in per cent of “rich region”) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                                                                   Germany          Italy 
                                                                                            _______________________ 
 
Presence of underground economy (in % of GDP, 2004) 1.29                 1.32 
 
Incidence of voluntary work (population aged 15-64) 0.82a                 0.52b 
 
Presence of non-profit organizations (per head of popul.) 1.05c                 0.68d 
 
Number of organ donations (per million people)  1.32e                 0.43f 
 
EU assessment of government quality          0.21                -0.97 
   (deviations from national average, 2010) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
a. Average of 1999, 2004 and 2009.    b. 1995-2014.        c. 2008.        d. 2011.                 
e. 2005-14.        f. 2000-14. 
 
Sources: Charron et al., 2012; Tafenau et al., 2010;  Bundesministerium für Familie, 
2010; ISTAT, 2016; Tamm et al., 2011; ISTAT, Censimento dell’industria e dei servizi, 
primi risultati, 2011; Deutsche Stiftung Organtransplantation; Centro nazionale trapianti 
 
 
Further indirect evidence on this issue comes from a large comparative exercise, carried 
out for the European Commission, which attempts to quantify the quality of government 
in some 170 regions across Europe [Charron et al, 2012; Charron, 2013]. Government 
quality in this work encompasses a low level of corruption, presence of the rule of law 
as well as government effectiveness and accountability in areas such as public 
education, public health and law enforcement. Indices of quality were derived 
combining national governance data (coming from the World Bank) with regional 
evidence obtained from a survey of 34,000 EU citizens. Relative to the European 
average, overall government quality so defined was well below in Italy and well above 
in Germany in both 2010 and 2013. This may not be very surprising. What is 
particularly striking, however, is that at the regional level, the government quality of the 
Mezzogiorno was some three times worse than that of the country’s Centre-North, while 
East Germany’s regional governments, by contrast, had a score that in 2010 was, on 
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average, actually superior to that of the West German Länder, while in 2013 it was only 
marginally inferior. 
 
More broadly, it is difficult to find any evidence in East Germany of the widespread 
corruption and rent-seeking which have been endemic in much of Southern Italy over 
the last few decades. Nor is there any evidence showing the presence of large criminal 
organizations, such as the well-known mafia, camorra and ‘ndragheta which have 
plagued, in particular, Sicily, the Naples area and Calabria. In other words, the legacy of 
several centuries of relatively advanced institutions and of a relatively successful history 
(at least in comparison with the Mezzogiorno) seems to have left traces in terms of the 
presence of social capital, trust and institutional quality, despite the destructive 
experience of four decades of Communism.  
 
This, in turn, is bound to have had significant economic effects. As has convincingly 
been argued, both trust and social capital are essential elements for the successful 
workings of a market economy [Arrow, 1972]. More recent empirical research has also 
shown that the presence of social capital favours economic prosperity and economic 
growth [Knack and Keefer, 1997; Horváth, 2013]. It is perhaps no great wonder after all 
that East Germany has, so far at least, managed a relatively successful convergence path, 
while Southern Italy has dismally failed.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has concentrated on the evolution of regional gaps within Germany and Italy 
since 1991 when German reunification took place. East Germany has not become a new 
Mezzogiorno, even if the way unification was initially managed could have led (and did 
lead) many observers to fear such an outcome. While the area has not fully closed the 
gap in per capita GDP vis-à-vis the Western part of the country, this gap has shrunk 
from two-thirds in 1991 to less than one-third in 2016. In Italy, over the same period, the 
gap (at over 40 per cent) has remained virtually unchanged.   
 
The paper draws attention, in particular, to the relative performance of the two regions’ 
tradeable sectors. The rapid rise in the trade/output share of East Germany seems to have 
been a powerful contributor to the closing of the East-West income gap. The 
Mezzogiorno’s tradeable sector, by contrast, has remained both small and 
underdeveloped.  
 
Behind the differences in the tradeable performances of East Germany and Southern 
Italy lie other features such as economic policy, labour market behaviour and, 
especially, historically based social norms. German economic policy concentrated on 
infrastructure provision; Italian policies maintained their emphasis on (often 
debilitating) transfer payments. Labour market behaviour differed, with East German 
workers accepting compensation levels below those of their West German counterparts, 
despite earlier union promises of wage equalization. There was no similar moderation in 
the Mezzogiorno. 
 
Trying to compare, let alone measure, the relative contributions of these various factors 
is virtually impossible. There are clearly mutual interactions at work. The presence of 
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trust encourages private investment, its absence has the opposite effect; trust and  norms 
of hard work also facilitate technology transfers and the social relations needed for 
producing complex manufactures; these various factors, in turn, may also ease potential 
labour market conflicts and (in a virtuous circle) contribute to trust building; corruption 
and rent seeking, on the other hand, stifle productive activity thus reinforcing 
underdevelopment and, in the process, undermining what little social capital there may 
be. 
 
The differential experience on the production side also explains the different 
consumption patterns that have emerged. Convergence in GDP per capita has made it 
easier for Germany to close the consumption gap between East and West. Absence of 
this convergence in Italy has meant that transfers have had to shoulder all the burden of 
keeping up living standards in the Mezzogiorno. Given the pressures on the Italian 
budget, it is no surprise that the country’s consumption gap has risen over the last 20 
years. Using the deficit in trade and non-factor services (Figure 5) as a proxy for this net 
absorption, Southern Italy has seen virtually no change in its (large) net absorption of 
real resources from the rest of the world, East Germany, by contrast has witnessed a 
sharp drop. 
 
It is not implausible to think that this differing performance, particularly noticeable in 
the area of advanced and complex manufactured products is, at least in part, linked to 
the two regions’ different histories. East Germany seems clearly endowed with higher 
levels of trust and social capital than the Mezzogiorno, and has not fallen prey to the 
corruption and rent-seeking that characterize that region today. Much of this difference 
almost certainly reflects the persistence of social norms and informal institutions. And 
the higher institutional quality has, in turn, facilitated the production of complex 
tradeable products in East Germany. The exports this generated have been an important 
contributor to the per capita GDP convergence the region has seen since unification. 
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Footnotes 
 
1. The compositions of the two “poorer” and “richer” regions are shown in the footnotes 
to Table 1. Berlin, following common usage, is considered as part of West Germany. It 
could be argued that the transfer of virtually all government activity from Bonn to Berlin 
might have benefited the neighbouring Brandenburg Land and thus given a boost to the 
economy of East Germany that was absent in Italy. It should be borne in mind, however, 
that the move created a non-tradeable sector that might have absorbed talent and 
promoted rent-seeking activities. This is almost certainly what happened in Italy when 
regions were given significantly greater powers in 2001.  
 
2. This, by the way, has been the case for the better part of a century. Since the 1920s, 
bar a short period of convergence in the 1960s (which was subsequently undone), 
Southern Italian GDP per capita has drifted away from that of the Centre-North of the 
country.  
 
3. Interaction terms between the dummy variable and trade shares were found not to be 
significant. 
 
4. Net absorption data are available in the Italian regional accounts, but not in the 
German ones because of the absence of data on stock-building for the 16 Länder. To 
approximate this variable, it was assumed that stock-building at the regional level was 
the same as at the national one. It is highly unlikely that this simplification can greatly 
distort the results obtained. It should also be noted that these deficits are vis-à-vis the 
whole world, not just the rest of the country. 
 
5. And well over 50 per cent in the years 1991-95. 
 
6. At the time a parallel investigation for West/East Germany could not be done since 
the time series was too short. 
 
7. Data on internal migration for Italy were kindly provided by Dr Frank Heins of the 
Istituto di Ricerche sulla Popolazione e le Politiche Sociali.  
 
8. Economic explanations for why this break occurs are not easy to find.  
 
9. This wider definition of tradeables encompasses several other activities that are 
potentially exportable. Employment in “broad” tradeables, as here defined, includes not 
only the goods-producing sectors (agriculture, mining and manufacturing), but also 
tourism and a rough estimate of the element of financial services that might potentially 
be tradeable. To obtain this, it was assumed that a certain share of employment in 
finance would be devoted to supplying demand internal to the region, while any excess 
over this minimum level could be considered tradeable employment. The minimum level 
itself was assumed to be the share achieved by financial service employment in total 
employment in the German Land or Italian region with the lowest such share (usually 
Brandenburg or Sachsen-Anhalt in Germany and Calabria in Italy). 
 
10. The attempt is rough because the source quoted only shows a limited number of 
“product complexity” indices, not all of which closely fit the commodity composition of 
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German and Italian exports here used. The overall indices obtained in 2000 and in 2014 
(1.87 and 1.74 for Germany, 1.42 and 1.42 for Italy) are not, however, very different 
from the Hausman et al. results for 2010: 1.96 and 1.40 for the two countries 
respectively. If anything, this suggests that the East German result here shown may well 
be an underestimate. 
 
11. Further evidence corroborating East Germany’s greater relative competitiveness 
compared to that of Southern Italy comes from a very broad estimate of regional 
competitiveness produced by the European Commission [Annoni and Kozovska, 2010; 
Annoni and Dijkstra, 2013]. Some 70 indicators were used to construct an index that 
covers variables ranging from macroeconomics to educational and infrastructure 
provisions, from innovation to labour market efficiency, etc. In the first year for which 
this index is available (2010), the Mezzogiorno is shown as lagging Central-North Italy 
by a much wider margin than the lag between Eastern and Western Germany. By 2013, 
Southern Italy’s relative position had worsened further while East Germany’s position 
had improved. 
 
12. Inserting a dummy for the 11 observations for the OPEC countries, which have 
relatively high per capita incomes but very low export complexity indices, does not 
greatly change these results. The governance indicators remain statistically highly 
significant. Details are available from the authors. As an example, linking export 
complexity to the presence of the rule of law and to per capita incomes expressed in 
purchasing power parity in 2010 gives the following result: 
 
Export complex. = -0.19+0.52***Rule of Law+0.0002GDP per cap.–0.77***OPEC                  
                                (0.14) (0.13)                          (0.00)                         (0.23) 
                                R2 = 0.52. 
 
13. Fafchamps [2011] provides a useful framework (based on the way people are 
allocated to tasks) that links structural change over the course of economic development 
to changes in social norms. 
 
14. There were, of course, significant differences between East and West before the 
second world war because of the presence of the, largely agricultural, territories of 
Pomerania and East Prussia. These, however, were ceded in 1945 and are no longer part 
of East Germany. 
 
15. Surprising as it may sound, the de-nazification process of the German civil service 
after the second world war was not only very short-lived but also much milder than the 
fury with which the East German elites were chased from their jobs, whether they had 
had a Communist past or not, and this not just in the civil service but also in the 
scientific, educational and even cultural fields [Giacché, 2013]. 
 
16. There is, however, also survey evidence showing that East Germans feel that 
avoiding taxes is more reprehensible than do West Germans [Torgler, 2003]. 
 
17. Indeed, an earlier estimate of the shadow economy in Germany for 1999 (based, 
however, solely on survey data) had even come to the conclusion that this represented a 
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smaller component of GDP in the East than in the West [Mummert and Schneider, 
2002]. 
 
18. As for electoral participation, this is lower in East Germany than in West Germany, 
but the gap for federal elections is of the order of 3 to 8 percentage points [DIW, 2015], 
as against a gap between the Centre-North and the Mezzogiorno of some of 8 to 12 
percentage points in Italian legislative (or politiche) elections [Regione Emilia-
Romagna, 2013]. 
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Statistical Annex:  Instrumental Variables Estimation of Trade and GDP per 
Capita 
 
The instrumental variables estimation of the effects of trade on GDP per capita closely 
follows the approach by Frankel and Romer [1999]. In order to capture the geographic 
component of trade, a gravity model of bilateral trade is separately estimated for 
Germany and Italy between each region and their main 100 trading partners in the 
world. The gravity model takes the following form: 
 
ln (
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
) =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗 + 𝛼5𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑗 
+𝛼6(𝐿𝑖 + 𝐿𝑗) + 𝛼7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 + 𝛼8𝐵𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼9𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼10𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖 + 𝛼11𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑖 
+𝛼12𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗 + 𝛼13𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑗+𝛼14𝐵𝑖𝑗(𝐿𝑖 + 𝐿𝑗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 (A1) 
 
where i denotes the Land (i = 1, 2, …, 16: Germany) or the region (i = 1, 2, …, 20: 
Italy),  j = 1, 2, …, 100 is the foreign country, 𝜏𝑖𝑗 measures the bilateral trade between 
Land/region i and country j, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 is regional GDP, 𝐷𝑖𝑗 is the metric distance between 
region i and country j, 𝑁𝑖 is the population of region i, 𝐴𝑖 is its size in km
2, GDPj is the 
GDP of the foreign country, Li is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if region i is 
landlocked, 𝐿𝑗 is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if country j is landlocked, 
and 𝐵𝑖𝑗 is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if there is a common border 
between region i and country j. 
 
Equation (A1) is estimated by OLS separately for Germany and for Italy. Table A1 
presents the estimation results for the cross-sectional estimates of Tables 2 and 3. 
Distance attracts a negative coefficient, even after the interaction with the cross-border 
dummy is considered: the estimated elasticity of trade with respect to distance between 
region i and country j is about -1 for Germany and -1.1 for Italy. Bilateral trade is 
increasing in the population of the foreign country and is reduced when either the 
domestic region or the foreign country is landlocked. The population of the region has a 
negative coefficient for Germany and positive for Italy, whereas the area of the foreign 
country is not statistically significant. The dummy for poor regions is negative and 
significant both for Germany and for Italy. 
 
The fitted values from equation (A1) are used to construct the geographic component of 
region i’s trade. Equation (A1) can be expressed compactly in vector form as 
ln(𝜏𝑖𝑗/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖) = 𝜶
′ ∙ 𝒙𝒊𝒋 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗. The predicted trade share ?̂?𝑖 is thus computed as: 
 
?̂?𝑖 = ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(?̂?′ ∙ 𝒙𝒊𝒋)
100
𝑗=1  (A2) 
 
for each region i. The predicted values ?̂?𝑖 can be used as instruments when regressing 
the observed trade shares on GDP per capita. The correlation coefficients between the 
actual and the constructed trade shares are 0.784 for Germany and 0.758 for Italy. Table 
A2 presents the relationship between observed and constructed trade share. Even after 
controlling for the population and the size of the regions, the constructed trade share 
contributes significant explanatory power to actual trade. 
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The predicted values ?̂?𝑖 are then used as instruments for the observed trade shares 𝑇𝑖 in 
the regressions of GDP per capita of region i on the trade share, the logarithm of 
population, the logarithm of size, and the area dummies 𝑆𝑖 for eastern Länder (Germany) 
and for southern regions (Italy): 
 
  ln (
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
𝑁𝑖
) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖           (A3) 
 
Equation (A3) is estimated separately for Germany and for Italy both by OLS and by IV, 
and the regression results are reported in Table 4 (without the area dummies) and in 
Table 5 (with the area dummies). 
 
In order to validate the separate estimation of GDP per capita in Germany and in Italy, 
Table A3 presents the results of a pooled regression for the regions of the two countries. 
Columns (1) and (2) present the results of estimation by OLS, and columns (3) and (4) 
the estimation by IV. Columns (2) and (4) contain the coefficients of the variables 
interacted with a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for all the regions in East 
Germany. The null hypothesis that the coefficients on the variables are the same for 
Germany and Italy is rejected both when the equation is estimated by OLS (F(6,24) = 
2.70) and when it is estimated by IV (Chi2(6) = 32,48). 
 
Data sources: 
 
Regional accounts were obtained from the official German and Italian statistical sites 
(Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung 
der Länder; ISTAT, Conti e aggregati economici territoriali). Foreign trade data for 
Germany come from the Statistisches Bundesamt, GENESIS-Online data bank; for Italy 
from ISTAT’s Coeweb data bank. Distances between the various national and regional 
capitals come from the DistanceFromTo website. Whether countries or regions were 
landlocked or had common borders was subjectively decided by looking at an atlas. 
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Table A1. The Bilateral Trade Equation 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
                                                     
                                             Germany                                         Italy               
                                  (1)                     (2)                         (3)                      (4)        
                            Variable           Interaction               Variable          Interaction    
_________________________________________________________ 
                   Dependent variable: log of trade share 
 
Constant        24.089***     0.753               -31.670***   9.625***     
               (0.657)      (1.439)        (2.197)            (2.626)     
 
Ln distance     -0.723***    -0.014        -0.960***   0.049     
                (0.030)      (0.064)        (0.067)            (0.080)     
 
Ln population  -0.108*        0.593***        0.556***        -0.178      
(country i)     (0.051)      (0.094)        (0.101)            (0.138)     
 
Ln size             0.028       -0.363***        0.335               -0.261     
(country i)     (0.030)      (0.052)        (0.255)            (0.291)     
 
Ln population   0.011    -0.003                   -0.041    0.161+     
(country j)     (0.032)      (0.064)        (0.068)     (0.091)     
 
Ln area         -0.077***        0.054          -0.119*            -0.026     
(country j)     (0.019)      (0.037)        (0.038)     (0.052)     
 
Ln GDP            0.945***   -0.087               1.039***           -0.279** 
(country j)        (0.027)          (0.061)                 (0.061)              (0.087) 
 
Landlocked       0.192*      -0.253         -0.018      0.539*     
                 (0.083)       (0.156)        (0.214)     (0.262)     
 
East            -0.294***                                            
                 (0.067)                                             
 
South                                                  -1.454***               
                                                                     (0.082)                  
 
No. obs.               1503                                  1958           
Adjusted R2       0.740                 0.554           
Root MSE          0.920             1.635           
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. The trade share is defined 
as the ratio between the bilateral trade between Land/region i and country j and the GDP 
of country I (equation (A1). 
+ Significant at 10%  *Significant at 5%  **Significant at 1%  *** Significant at 0.1%. 
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Table A2. The Relation between Actual and Constructed Trade Shares  
_________________________________________________________ 
                   
                                               Germany                                               Italy                             
                                 (1)              (2)              (3)                (4)              (5)             (6)        
_________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                Dependent variable: Actual trade share 
 
Constant        -0.116          1.538*          0.441          0.230***    -0.944+     -0.699   
             (0.168)       (0.524)         (0.850)        (0.035)         (0.456)      (0.492)    
 
Constructed      1.563***                     1.545*        0.536***                          0.383**  
trade share   (0.279)                            (0.528)        (0.081)                              (0.105)    
 
Ln population                      -0.044         -0.096                             0.009        0.034    
                                   (0.161)        (0.112)                          (0.046)     (0.048)    
 
Ln size                                 -0.050          0.028                     0.139         0.132    
                                    (0.118)        (0.079)                            (0.080)      (0.083)    
 
East            0.106          -0.193          0.022                                          
              (0.110)        (0.129)        (0.148)                                           
 
South                                                              -0.009        -0.194**     0.076   
                                                                 (0.062)       (0.051)      (0.059)    
 
 
No. obs.             16                 16                16                   20              20         20    
Adjusted R2     0.565            0.084           0.539             0.530          0.515          0.559    
Root MSE       0.623            0.257           0.662             0.117          0.119          0.114   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
+     Significant at 10% 
*     Significant at 5%. 
**   Significant at 1%. 
*** Significant at 0.1%. 
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Table A3. Pooled regression for trade and GDP per capita 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
                                               OLS                                                  IV              
                                (1)                      (2)                       (3)                        (4)      
                           Variable            Interaction             Variable             Interaction  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                             Dependent variable: log of GDP per capita 
 
Constant     3.451***     -0.811           4.239***    -1.545    
                 (0.421)       (0.557)        (1.262)      (1.285)    
 
Trade share      0.409          0.191           1.308*      -0.737    
                 (0.384)       (0.390)        (0.617)      (0.620)    
 
Ln population  -0.070+         0.223**      -0.082+        0.237*** 
                (0.039)      (0.073)       (0.043)     (0.064)    
 
Ln size            0.030        -0.119        -0.086      -0.010    
                (0.066)      (0.071)        (0.168)      (0.170)    
 
Dummy for  -0.385*         0.400         -0.189         0.295    
poor region      (0.181)       (0.260)        (0.179)      (0.235)    
 
Trade share    -0.094       -0.073         -0.179      -0.161    
× Dummy for  (0.370)       (0.448)        (0.928)      (0.962)    
poor region 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
No. obs.                                   36                                                   36          
Adjusted R2                          0.832                                              0.738          
Root MSE                            0.114                                              0.116          
F(6,24)                                 2.67*                                      
Chi2(6)                                                                                        30.06***        
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Columns (2) and (4): interactions with Dummy variable = 1 for German regions. 
The null hypothesis for the test statistics F(6,24) and Chi(6) is that the coefficients on 
the interactions of the variables with the dummy variable for the German regions are 
jointly equal to zero. 
+     Significant at 10%. 
*     Significant at 5%.            **   Significant at 1%              *** Significant at 0.1%. 
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